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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, Public Citizen, a “national, non-profit public interest 
organization,”1 issued a report entitled “The Arbitration Trap:  How 
 
 * Squire, Sanders and Dempsey Designated Professor of Law, Moritz College of 
Law, Ohio State University.  Thanks to Ted Frank and Douglas Cole for help on this 
article and to Tim Nittle and Catharine Adkins for research assistance. 
 ** Squire, Sanders and Dempsey L.L.P.  Thanks to Chris Haas and Todd Starker for 
reviewing earlier drafts of this article.  Special thanks to Glenn Myatt, PhD, for 
commenting on earlier drafts of this article, for the many tutorials on data mining, and for 
the use of his Traceis data mining software. 
 1. See Public Citizen, http://www.citizen.org/. 
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Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers,”2 concluding that the 
arbitration process routinely exploits consumers.3  Public Citizen drew 
this sweeping conclusion after analyzing approximately 34,000 points of 
data the National Arbitration Foundation (“NAF”) collected about its 
California arbitrations.4 
Unfortunately, Public Citizen’s analysis of the NAF data does not 
support its conclusions primarily because its conclusions cannot be 
extended beyond the set of cases the data contains, i.e., collection cases 
filed by creditors, including credit card companies, against consumers 
with outstanding balances on their accounts.  Rather than attempt to draw 
conclusions based solely on this data, Public Citizen instead extrapolates 
its conclusions to all consumer arbitration cases even though collections 
cases are unique.5  Public Citizen ultimately concludes that binding, 
mandatory arbitration is bad for consumers in all situations based on a 
data set comprised of practically all—upwards of 99.9%—collections 
cases.6 
Given the sweeping nature of the Public Citizen Report’s 
conclusions, we believe that additional data analysis is warranted.  In 
fact, our data analysis establishes that many of Public Citizen’s claims 
are exaggerated and should be considered in context.7  In addition, and 
perhaps more importantly, our analysis of this data reveals that the 
 
 2. See Public Citizen, “The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card Companies Ensnare 
Consumers,” http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf (Sept. 27, 2007) 
[hereinafter Public Citizen Report]. 
 3. See Public Citizen Report, supra note 2, at 1 (“This report shows that binding 
mandatory arbitration is a rigged game in which justice is dealt from a deck stacked 
against consumers.”). 
 4. See id. (“For the first time, we have comprehensively crunched data for the 
nearly 34,000 cases contained in NAF’s California reports.”). 
 5. See id. (“NAF identified virtually all of its California cases as ‘collection’ cases 
filed against consumers by credit card companies or firms that buy debts from these 
companies for cents on the dollar.”); see id. at 1-2 (“All but 118 of the cases were filed 
against consumers by credit card/finance companies or firms that purchase their debts.  In 
other words, consumers chose to bring only 118 cases before NAF while corporations 
chose this business friendly forum nearly 34,000 times—99.6 percent of the total 
cases.”); see id. at 5-6 (“Between Jan. 1, 2003 and March 31, 2007, NAF handled nearly 
34,000 consumer arbitrations in California alone.  The firm described 99.9 percent of 
those arbitrations as ‘collection’ cases.”); see also Hillard M. Sterling & Philip G. 
Schrag, Default Judgments Against Consumers: Has the System Failed?, 67 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 357 (1990) (finding consumers prevailed in Small Claims and Conciliation Branch 
of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia only 4% of the time; the vast majority 
of cases were default judgments); Matthew C. McDonald & Kirkland E. Reid, 
Arbitration Opponents Barking Up Wrong Branch, 62 ALA. LAW. 56, 60 (2001) 
(“[V]irtually all of these cases were collection cases filed by the bank against customers 
more than six months behind on their credit cards bills.  Unquestionably, the result in 
collections court would have been the same.”). 
 6. Public Citizen Report, supra note 2, at 5-6. 
 7. See infra Sections II and III. 
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consumer arbitration process provides a more pro-consumer environment 
for claims adjudication than does the traditional court system.  This 
conclusion suggests that consumers should be less wary of the arbitration 
process even if the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 20098 is never 
enacted. 
This article sets forth in Section II the primary arguments and 
conclusions of the Public Citizen Report, followed in Section III by a 
more detailed look at the underlying data.  Section IV examines recent 
court decisions in which consumers claim that the NAF is an unfair 
forum, and the courts’ rulings that generally reject that argument.  
Finally, Section V sets forth these authors’ conclusions regarding the 
data. 
II. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CRITICAL VIEW OF ARBITRATION 
A review of the Public Citizen Report reveals that Public Citizen’s 
agenda is to convince others that arbitration is bad for consumers 
because they frequently lose when a party to the arbitration process.  In 
the opening paragraph of its Report, Public Citizen proclaims:  “[t]his 
report shows that binding mandatory arbitration is a rigged game in 
which justice is dealt from a deck stacked against consumers.”9  The first 
chapter boasts the following conclusions: 
• “Enormous Amount of Consumers Affected”10 
• “Substantial Use of Binding Mandatory Arbitration by the 
Credit Card Industry”11 
• “Corporations—not Consumers—Choose Binding 
Mandatory Arbitration”12 
• “Stunning Results that Disfavor Consumers”13 
• “Biased Decision-Makers”14 
 
 8. H.R. 1020, 111st Cong. (2007).  The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 § 2(b) 
would render unenforceable pre-dispute arbitration agreements of consumer, 
employment, or franchise disputes. 
 9. Public Citizen Report, supra note 2, at 1. 
 10. Id.  Public Citizen reaches this conclusion because the NAF data set includes 
data points for approximately 34,000 cases between the dates of January 1, 2003 and 
March 31, 2007. 
 11. Id.  This conclusion is based on the NAF data set that includes virtually all 
“collection” cases, which are typically cases based on a debt owed or claimed to be owed. 
 12. Id. at 1-2.  Public Citizen reaches this conclusion because the data set shows that 
the vast majority (more than 99%) of claimants are businesses, as opposed to consumers. 
 13. Id. at 2.  This conclusion is based on Public Citizen’s interpretation of consumers 
“winning” 94% of cases that proceeded to the point at which an arbitrator is appointed. 
 14. Id.  This conclusion is based on Public Citizen’s speculation that arbitrators are 
inclined to rule in favor of businesses because the businesses are “repeat players” and 
because the arbitrators are interested in continuing to receive repeat business by ruling in 
favor of the corporations. 
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• “The Busiest Arbitrators Produce the Results Corporations 
Seek”15 
• “A Race to the Bottom for Arbitration Firms”16 
• “A Process Shrouded in Secrecy”17 
• “A Lack of Due Process Safeguards”18 
These “conclusions,” however, read more like headlines,19 and the report 
contains surprisingly little data analysis in light of its extreme 
conclusions.  The Public Citizen Report’s major criticisms of consumer 
arbitration can be summarized as follows:  1) consumers always lose in 
arbitration; 2) repeat arbitrators favor corporate clients; and 3) consumers 
pay more in arbitration fees than they would in court fees.  Given the 
headline-grabbing conclusions Public Citizen draws, a closer 
examination of Public Citizen’s data analysis is worthwhile.20 
 
 15. Id.  This conclusion is based on Public Citizen’s examination of the record of 
arbitrators who handle large volumes of the NAF consumer arbitrations. 
 16. Id.  This conclusion is based on anecdotal evidence that arbitrators who rule in 
favor of consumers do not receive any additional work from the businesses the arbitrators 
ruled against.  Accordingly, this point is not based on the NAF arbitration data. 
 17. Id.  Public Citizen appears to reach this conclusion because arbitration is a 
confidential process, and because of the confidentiality, the businesses will likely have 
more institutional knowledge about arbitrators and their decisions than “one shot” 
consumer disputants.  Again, the data available from NAF does not speak to this point. 
 18. Id.  This conclusion is based on an allegation that the NAF procedures are 
insufficient to adjudicate a claim in arbitration.  As with the last two points, this 
conclusion is not based on the arbitration data NAF makes available but by Public 
Citizen’s interpretation of the NAF procedures. 
 19. In addition, the first chapter of the Public Citizen Report sets forth a bullet-point 
list of the reasons why the consumer group thinks that the arbitral process—any arbitral 
process—is bad for consumers.  Those reasons are: 1) the proceedings are “secret,” i.e., 
confidential; 2) the arbitral forums have an incentive to create business-friendly rules in 
order to attract business clients; 3) individual arbitrators have an interest in continued 
employment so they are likely to rule in favor of the businesses; 4) arbitration costs more 
than court proceedings; 5) the right to appeal is limited by statute and allegedly not well 
communicated to the consumers; 6) the parties have a limited right to discovery in 
arbitration; 7) arbitral forums do not provide due process for consumers; 8) the arbitral 
forums do not allow for class-action procedures; and 9) the NAF has a “loser pays” rule 
that could shift fees in certain situations.  Id. at 7-10. 
The NAF arbitration data supports none of these points.  Thus, some of these points 
involve overreaching on Public Citizen’s part.  For example, in point number 9, Public 
Citizen claims that the “loser pays” rule makes arbitration bad for consumers.  Public 
Citizen, however, neglects to explain that the “loser pays” rule only applies in situations 
in which fee shifting “is permitted by law.”  NAF Code of Procedure Rule 37C.  In other 
words, fee shifting under NAF procedure would only occur if the fee shifting is permitted 
in a court, making the consumer no better or worse off than if that consumer were in 
court. 
 20. The Public Citizen Report states that the group spent as many as eight months 
“comprehensively crunch[ing] data.”  Public Citizen Report, supra note 2, at 1.  
However, the Report contains little statistical analysis.  Where statistical support is 
lacking, the Report tends to buttress its arguments with anecdotal evidence. 
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A. Public Citizen Claims that Consumers Always Lose in Arbitration 
Public Citizen claims that consumers fare quite poorly in arbitration.  
To support that claim, Public Citizen emphasizes that consumers filed 
only 118 out of the approximately 34,000 cases collected.21  Businesses 
brought the remainder (over 99%) of these disputes.  That more 
businesses than consumers take advantage of the arbitration process is no 
surprise, however, especially when one learns that 99% of the cases 
brought are “collections” cases.  If a business has a dispute, it must bring 
its claim in the arbitral forum pursuant to its arbitration agreement with 
the consumer.22  Moreover, NAF has no control over who chooses to 
bring a claim.  The lack of evidence articulating why more consumers do 
not file suggests no ulterior motive on NAF or any other arbitral 
organization’s part.23 
In addition, Public Citizen claims that consumers are most likely to 
fare poorly when an arbitrator is assigned to the case.  The Report notes 
that for cases resulting in a document hearing, consumers won only two 
out of 16,056 cases,24 and in cases resulting in what is described as a 
“hearing,”25 consumers win in only twenty-eight of 2,019 cases.26  Once 
again, most of these cases involve collections disputes, so a consumer 
victory is unlikely.  Moreover, focusing on these cases ignores that 
consumers “win” cases brought by businesses when these cases are later 
dismissed, just as businesses “win” cases brought by consumers that are  
 
 21. Id. at 15 (“Consumers filed only 118 cases against corporations—0.35 percent of 
all cases—and all but 13 of the consumer-filed cases were labeled ‘collection.’”). 
Of the 118 claims consumers filed, the NAF data shows that consumers dismissed 
approximately 62 of these 118 cases, or approximately 52%.  These cases were labeled 
“business wins.”  The data, however, does not indicate what constitutes a dismissal and 
what does not.  It is possible that some of these “dismissals” are actually settlements, 
even though the NAF data specifically labels a large number of cases as “settled.” 
 22. See id. at 3 (noting the fact that many consumer transactions include arbitration 
agreements).  If the businesses brought suit in court, presumably such an action would be 
in breach of the consumers’ contracts. 
 23. The Public Citizen Report alleges that NAF markets its services directly to 
businesses.  See id. at 18-19.  According to the Report, NAF advertises that it provides 
the following benefits to businesses:  1) limited discovery; 2) lower costs; 3) no jury 
trials; 4) awards limited by the amount of the claim; 5) the possibility for fee-shifting to 
the losing party; and 6) the ability to save on collection costs.  Id. at 19 (citing a 
document claimed to have been admitted into evidence in the case Toppings v. Meritech 
Mortgage Inc., 569 S.E.2d 149 (W. Va. 2002)). 
 24. Id. at 15.  In this category, the business “won” in 99.9% of cases. 
 25. The data is unclear as to whether the “hearing” is a hearing in person or a 
hearing based on documents submitted. 
 26. Id.  In this category, the business “won” in 98.6% of the cases. 
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later dismissed.27  Cases that settle, of course, do not designate a 
prevailing party.28 
The Public Citizen Report places significant emphasis on “wins” 
and “losses” for that portion of the NAF data that includes a “prevailing 
party” designation.  For the reasons stated below, this emphasis is short-
sighted.29  In a significant number of cases, the arbitrator’s award is 
lower than the amount that the business initially sought.30  In many ways, 
a reduction in the amount claimed is, at least, a partial win for the 
consumer, and not an outright victory for the business.31  In this sense, 
the conclusions drawn in the Public Citizen Report are incomplete and 
 
 27. The NAF data appears to make these categorical “win/loss” designations as they 
relate to dismissals.  The NAF has an additional category of “Award by Settlement” 
which almost always lists the business as the “prevailing party.”  In a handful of these 
“Award by Settlement” cases, though, the NAF would not name a prevailing party.  In 
contrast, all cases with a disposition of “Settled,” the NAF does not name a prevailing 
party—instead, the data designates “N/A” where the prevailing party should be listed.  
Given the fact that no “Settled” case names a prevailing party, it is curious that a case 
involving an “Award by Settlement” would nearly categorically be called a business 
“win.” 
 28. Id.; see also supra note 25.  Analysis of the “prevailing party” can be 
summarized in the following chart: 
Prevailing Parties by Dispute Resolution Categories 
 
 29. See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See infra notes 38-44, 64-66, and accompanying text.  In July 2008, Navigant 
Consulting provided the NAF with a Memorandum analyzing the NAF data in light of the 
Public Citizen Report.  See Nielson et al., National Arbitration Forum: California 
Consumer Arbitration Data (Navigant Consulting, July 11, 2008), available at 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_doc.php?docId=1212 [hereinafter 
Navigant Report].  The Navigant Report concludes: 
In total, out of 26,665 cases in the Public Citizen Data for which the disposition 
was identified as “Hearing,” “Hearing/Default,” or “Dismissed,” consumers 
were reported to have prevailed or had the case against them dismissed in 8558 
cases.  There were also an additional 4376 cases in which claims against 
consumers were reduced by the NAF. 
Id. at 4. 
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might not fully and accurately describe how consumers fare in 
arbitration. 
B. Public Citizen Infers that Allegedly Self-Interested Arbitrators Rule 
Against Consumers 
Public Citizen claims that the arbitrators who hear the most cases 
are the ones who are most biased in favor of the corporations.  Public 
Citizen claims that the “repeat player effect” is one of the “major 
problems with arbitration.”32  According to the Report, “28 arbitrators 
handled 17,265 cases—accounting for a whopping 89.5 percent of cases 
in which an arbitrator was appointed—and ruled for the company nearly 
95 percent of the time.”33  These twenty-eight arbitrators handled 
between 138 cases and 1,332 cases, with “decision records for corporate 
interest of between 72.2 percent and 98.8 percent—while 25 arbitrators 
had a record of 92.4 percent or higher” in favor of the business client.34 
Public Citizen is particularly critical of the most prolific arbitrator, 
Joseph Nardulli, who handled 1,332 cases between January 1, 2003 and 
March 31, 2007.35  According to the Public Citizen Report, the total 
amount claimed in those 1,332 cases was $15,602,571 and the total 
amount awarded was $15,039,941, with the business winning in 97.0% 
of the cases and the consumers winning in 1.6% of the cases.36  The 
win/loss numbers for Mr. Nardulli, however, must be viewed in 
perspective.  Of Mr. Nardulli’s 1,332 assigned cases, only nineteen were 
identified as settled; two were resolved through “award by settlement 
agreement;” the business claimant dismissed twenty of the cases; and 
hearings resolved another fifteen.37  NAF used the curious title 
 
 32. Public Citizen Report, supra note 2, at 32 (“One of the major problems with 
arbitration is a documented lack of neutrality on the part of arbitration firms that is called 
the ‘repeat player effect.’  This is a situation in which a built-in bias develops in favor of 
the claimant that frequently sends business to the arbitration firm in the form of claims 
against its customers, who are usually participating for the first-time.”). 
 33. Id. at 15.  The Public Citizen Report then claims that another “120 arbitrators 
handled slightly more than 10 percent of the cases in which an arbitrator was assigned.  
They ruled for businesses 86 percent of the time and for consumers 10 percent.”  Id.  
These statistics are misleading because they include cases that were settled or dismissed.  
Not all cases assigned to an arbitrator resulted in an adjudicated award.  As presented, the 
Public Citizen Report does not make clear which cases were considered in generating 
these statistics, whether these statistics include the settled and/or dismissed cases, or 
whether they only include the cases that were adjudicated through a hearing or document 
hearing. 
 34. Id. at 16.  Again, the way in which the Public Citizen Report characterizes 
“wins” is unclear and not explained in the report. 
 35. Id. at 15-16. 
 36. Id. at 16.  Presumably, the difference between the win percentages takes into 
account that some portion of Mr. Nardulli’s cases settled. 
 37. Id. at 2-3. 
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“Hearing/Default” for the final 1,275 cases.  The data does not indicate 
whether those cases went to hearing or involved respondents who simply 
did not participate in the arbitration.  If a large portion of the 1,275 cases 
involved non-participating consumers, which would be typical in 
collections cases,38 Mr. Nardulli’s win/loss numbers would appear 
considerably less problematic.  Unfortunately, the data that would 
provide this information was not collected. 
Even looking at the bare win/loss numbers for Mr. Nardulli’s 
assigned cases, the consumers did gain something—Nardulli reduced the 
prevailing parties’ damages by over half a million dollars.39  Stated 
another way, Mr. Nardulli did not grant over 3% of claimed damages to 
the claimants, who, as noted above, were overwhelmingly the business 
party.40  Although these numbers appear low, they should not be 
dismissed outright.  These numbers demonstrate that the arbitrator gave 
consideration to consumers’ claims. 
The top twenty-eight arbitrators, including Mr. Nardulli, also did 
not award all of the amounts businesses claimed in the arbitrations.  
According to the Public Citizen Report, the top twenty-eight arbitrators 
handled cases in which claimants sought $200,736,495, but only awarded 
$185,479,341—a difference of over $15 million.41  The difference 
between these numbers suggests that the consumer received a cumulative 
break of approximately 7.6%.42 
Just as Mr. Nardulli is notable for the large number of cases he 
adjudicated, arbitrator Jonathan Krotinger is notable for the large number 
of consumer wins he allowed.  The Public Citizen Report acknowledges 
that Mr. Krotinger ruled in favor of the business interest in 72.2% of 
cases and in favor of the consumer in 24.7% of cases.43  In Mr. 
Krotinger’s cases, the amount claimed was $7,444,639, yet he awarded 
 
 38. See Sterling & Schrag, supra note 5 (concluding that consumers prevailed in 
Small Claims and Conciliation Branch of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia 
only 4% of the time, with the vast majority of cases ending in default judgments). 
 39. The precise difference between the amount claimed and the amount awarded is 
$562,630.  Public Citizen Report, supra note 2, at 16. 
 40. See supra note 20 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the number 
of business claimants as opposed to consumer claimants. 
 41. Public Citizen Report, supra note 2, at 16.  The actual difference between the 
two numbers is $15,257,154.  Id. 
 42. The 7.6% is derived from the difference of the amount claimed and amount 
awarded ($15,257,154) divided by the total amount claimed ($200,736,495).  This 
calculation assumes, however, that the consumers—as opposed to the businesses—
received the benefit of the reduced awards.  Because consumers only filed 118 of the 
claims, any reduction in the amount awarded to businesses would likely be negligible in 
the context of the data set as a whole.  Id. at 2. 
 43. Id. at 16.  These two figures leave approximately 3.1% of cases unaccounted for.  
Although the Report is not clear, the discrepancy can likely be explained by the presence 
of cases that settled for which the NAF did not declare a prevailing party. 
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$5,159,380—a difference of over $2 million.44  This difference indicates 
a “discount” of approximately 30%.45  What makes these numbers 
significant is that Mr. Krotinger handled a large number (571) of cases.46  
Despite this data, the Public Citizen Report relies on anecdotal evidence 
to suggest that arbitrators who rule, even once, in favor of consumers are 
systematically pushed out of NAF and not assigned any additional 
cases.47  The data, however, suggests that this is not the case and that the 
Public Citizen Report overstates its claim on this issue. 
Although the Public Citizen Report rightfully raises the issue of 
“repeat player” bias, the data does not necessarily support the Report’s 
strident conclusions.  Nevertheless, one way to reduce the perception of 
“repeat player” bias would be to ensure that adequate reporting and 
disclosure take place.48  In California, for example, arbitrators must 
disclose to disputants a wide variety of professional and personal 
information.49  Adopting a nationwide policy that repeat arbitrators 
 
 44. The exact difference in the figures is $2,285,259.  Id. 
 45. Again, this figure is calculated by dividing the difference in the two by the total 
amount claimed.  Id. 
 46. Id.  In addition, two other arbitrators ruled in favor of the business less than 90% 
of the time.  Those two arbitrators, Patrick Huang and Adrienne Jennings, participated in 
354 and 597 cases, respectively.  Id. 
 47. See id. at 30-31.  The report claims that arbitrator Elizabeth Bartholet was 
assigned as an arbitrator in twenty cases.  In the first eighteen, she ruled in favor of the 
business and the nineteenth case was dismissed.  In the twentieth case, however, she 
ruled in favor of the consumer and awarded the consumer approximately $48,000.  She 
claims that after this twentieth case, the NAF removed her from seven cases and 
businesses voluntarily dismissed another four cases.  Id. at 30. 
 48. For instance, the NAF Code of Conduct for Arbitrators states: “An Arbitrator 
should disclose any interest or relationship that affects impartiality or creates an 
unfavorable appearance of partiality or bias.”  NAF Code of Conduct for Arbitrators, 
Canon Two.  In addition, the AAA has a Consumer Due Process Protocol that 
specifically addresses the issue of an arbitrator’s previous appointment.  Under “Principle 
3: Independent and Impartial Neutral; Independent Administration,” the Code provides: 
5. Disclosure and Disqualification.  Beginning at the time of appointment, 
Neutrals should be required to disclose to the Independent ADR Institution any 
circumstance likely to affect impartiality, including any bias or financial or 
personal interest which might affect the result of the ADR proceeding, or any 
past or present relationship or experience with the parties or their 
representatives, including past ADR experiences.  The Independent ADR 
Institution should communicate any such information to the parties and other 
Neutrals, if any.  Upon objection of a party to continued service of the Neutral, 
the Independent ADR Institution should determine whether the Neutral should 
be disqualified and should inform the parties of its decision. The disclosure 
obligation of the Neutral and procedure for disqualification should continue 
throughout the period of appointment. 
AAA, Consumer Due Process Protocol (2008), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id= 22019 
(emphasis added). 
 49. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.9(a) (2008).  That statute provides: 
(a) In any arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement, when a person is to 
serve as a neutral arbitrator, the proposed neutral arbitrator shall disclose all 
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disclose previous cases handled for the business party, may alleviate 
some concern about “repeat player” bias and “secret proceedings.”50 
C. Public Citizen Claims that Consumers Pay Higher Costs in 
Arbitration Than They Would Pay in Court 
The Public Citizen Report also claims that arbitration costs 
consumers more than they would have to pay if they went to court.51  The 
 
matters that could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a 
doubt that the proposed neutral arbitrator would be able to be impartial, 
including all of the following: 
(1) The existence of any ground specified in Section 170.1 for 
disqualification of a judge.  For purposes of paragraph (8) of subdivision 
(a) of Section 170.1, the proposed neutral arbitrator shall disclose whether 
or not he or she has a current arrangement concerning prospective 
employment or other compensated service as a dispute resolution neutral 
or is participating in, or, within the last two years, has participated in, 
discussions regarding such prospective employment or service with a 
party to the proceeding. 
(2) Any matters required to be disclosed by the ethics standards for neutral 
arbitrators adopted by the Judicial Council pursuant to this chapter. 
(3) The names of the parties to all prior or pending noncollective 
bargaining cases in which the proposed neutral arbitrator served or is 
serving as a party arbitrator for any party to the arbitration proceeding or 
for a lawyer for a party and the results of each case arbitrated to 
conclusion, including the date of the arbitration award, identification of 
the prevailing party, the names of the parties’ attorneys and the amount of 
monetary damages awarded, if any.  In order to preserve confidentiality, it 
shall be sufficient to give the name of any party who is not a party to the 
pending arbitration as “claimant” or “respondent” if the party is an 
individual and not a business or corporate entity. 
(4) The names of the parties to all prior or pending noncollective 
bargaining cases involving any party to the arbitration or lawyer for a 
party for which the proposed neutral arbitrator served or is serving as 
neutral arbitrator, and the results of each case arbitrated to conclusion, 
including the date of the arbitration award, identification of the prevailing 
party, the names of the parties’ attorneys and the amount of monetary 
damages awarded, if any.  In order to preserve confidentiality, it shall be 
sufficient to give the name of any party not a party to the pending 
arbitration as “claimant” or “respondent” if the party is an individual and 
not a business or corporate entity. 
(5) Any attorney-client relationship the proposed neutral arbitrator has or 
had with any party or lawyer for a party to the arbitration proceeding. 
(6) Any professional or significant personal relationship the proposed 
neutral arbitrator or his or her spouse or minor child living in the 
household has or has had with any party to the arbitration proceeding or 
lawyer for a party. 
Id. 
 50. The Public Citizen Report assumes that arbitration confidentiality would 
preclude a reporting/disclosure requirement.  Public Citizen Report, supra note 2.  
Contracted-for arbitration confidentiality, however, could not waive disclosure 
requirements set forth in statutes, rules, and arbitral forum ethical rules. 
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Report notes that the NAF administrative fees are charged on a sliding 
scale, i.e., the amount of the fee is based on the amount of the claim.52  
However, NAF fees may not necessarily be the fees that the consumer 
pays in a consumer arbitration.  Certainly the parties are not required to 
pay the fees on a 50/50 basis if the parties have made other arrangements 
for fee payment.53 
Not surprisingly, the Public Citizen Report does not cite the NAF 
data regarding consumers’ fees.  Instead, the Report relies on anecdotal 
evidence and default fee charts to support its proposition that consumers 
pay more in arbitration than they would in court.54  As explained in more 
detail below,55 the NAF data demonstrates that consumers rarely pay a 
fee at all, and that the average fee is approximately $75.0056—not the 
thousands of dollars the Public Citizen Report would like its readers to 
believe consumers are paying to resolve their disputes in the arbitral 
forum.  Despite a lack of evidence, the Public Citizen Report then 
accuses the NAF arbitrators of “concealing” their fees by including the 
fees in the total award.57  However, the report contains no data showing 
 
 51. Id. at 34 (“Arbitration Often Costs Consumers More than Court”). 
 52. Id. 
 53. The NAF recognizes that consumer contracts may dictate the payment of 
arbitration fees.  In the absence of such an agreement, the NAF general rules (for claims 
less than $75,000) provide: 
Consumer Claimants: A Consumer Claimant pays the Filing Fee and one-half 
the fee for a Participatory Hearing selected by the Consumer up to a total of 
$250 (two hundred fifty dollars), unless otherwise provided by agreement of 
the Parties or by applicable law.  A Business Respondent pays the 
Commencement and Administrative Fees and the fee for a Participatory 
Hearing if selected by the Business Respondent, or, if selected by the 
Consumer, the amount of the Participatory Hearing Fee that remains unpaid 
after the Consumer Claimant has paid the Consumer’s portion of the 
Participatory Hearing Fee. 
Consumer Respondents: A Consumer Respondent pays one-half of the fee for a 
Participatory Hearing if selected by the Consumer Respondent up to a 
maximum of $250 (two hundred fifty dollars), unless otherwise provided by 
agreement of the Parties or by applicable law.  A Business Claimant pays the 
amount of the Participatory Hearing Fee that remains unpaid after the 
Consumer Respondent has paid the Consumer’s portion of the Participatory 
Hearing Fee. 
NAF Fee Schedule (Aug. 1, 2008), at 2, http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/ 
2008FeeSchedule-FinalPrint1.pdf. 
 54. Public Citizen Report, supra note 2, at 34-36. 
 55. See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 
 56. See Navigant Report, supra note 31, at 3 (“An arbitration fee was indicated to 
have been paid in 33,935 of the total 33,948 cases in the Public Citizen Data.  Of the 
33,935 cases when a fee was paid, the consumer did not pay any fee in 33,689 cases or 
99.3% of those cases.  In the 246 cases when the consumer paid a fee, the median 
consumer fee paid was $75.”). 
 57. See Public Citizen Report, supra note 2, at 37.  As support for its assertions, 
Public Citizen cites undisclosed “Documents from National Arbitration Forum arbitration 
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that the consumer actually pays more in arbitration than she would pay in 
court. 
As noted in this section, the Public Citizen Report bases its broad 
conclusions on a limited amount of available data.  For this reason, this 
article presents additional statistical analysis to put the report in 
perspective. 
III. WHAT THE DATA REALLY SAYS 
Although the data presented in the Public Citizen Report is 
generally accurate, the report draws the wrong conclusions from too little 
information.  The purpose of this section is to show that a more accurate 
data analysis puts in perspective many of the conclusions in the Public 
Citizen Report.58  In addition, this analysis will help identify those 
conclusions that the data does not support.  Further, this section identifies 
notable omissions from the data.  Finally, this section provides an 
analysis of the arbitration awards, consumer fees, and the length of time 
from the filing of the claim to disposition. 
A. What the Data Doesn’t Show 
Although the collection of data on approximately 34,000 cases is 
impressive,59 the type of information collected does not include some of 
the most basic information.  The categories of data collected include: 
case number, case name,60 case filing date, arbitrator selection date, case 
disposition date, dispute resolution,61 prevailing party, the amount 
claimed, the amount awarded, the name of the arbitrator, the amount of 
fees the consumer paid, the amount of fees the business paid, total fees, 
and whether counsel represented the consumer.  Yet the data has serious 
gaps.  In particular, the NAF data does not describe the claims involved 
 
decision awarded to MBNA Nov. 29, 2005, name of consumer-respondent redacted” and 
one California complaint.  See id. at 70 n.158-61. 
 58. The data utilized by the Public Citizen Report is available on Public Citizen’s 
website.  See http://www.citizen.org/congress/civjus/arbitration/ (follow “NAF California 
data” hyperlink).  These Authors analyzed the data file made available at this website for 
the analysis set forth in this Article. 
 59. In fact, 34,000 data points are more than necessary to create accurate prediction 
and other statistical models.  See GLENN J. MYATT, MAKING SENSE OF DATA: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS AND DATA MINING 215-16 (“The 
quality of the data is the most important aspect that influences the quality of the results 
from the analysis. . . .  Where appropriate, the data set should be partitioned into smaller 
sets to simplify the analysis.  At the end of the data preparation phase, one should be very 
familiar with the data and should already start identifying aspects of the data relating to 
the problem being solved.”). 
 60. The name of the consumer is never used, only an indication that one of the 
parties is a “consumer.”  The business party, however, is identified by name. 
 61. The types of resolutions are:  dismissed, settled, hearing, and hearing/default. 
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in each case nor does it indicate whether the respondent, typically the 
consumer, filed counterclaims. 
Despite the absence of critical data, the Public Citizen Report 
concludes that arbitration is bad for consumers at all times.62  In fact, the 
NAF data consists overwhelmingly (well over 99%) of collection cases 
in which the consumer is the defendant.63  Although empiricists who 
analyze this data may draw some conclusions from the data, those 
conclusions can only be extrapolated over a similar population.64  In 
other words, analysis of the NAF data can be used to draw conclusions 
about collection cases, but not other types of cases.65  For example, the 
NAF data does not establish how a consumer would fare as a plaintiff in 
a case involving any number of claims, such as an alleged violation of 
the Truth in Lending Act, a claim of fraud or misrepresentation, or even 
a claim for breach of contract. 
Another important missing piece of information is whether parties 
filed counterclaims during an arbitration.  Because the NAF data does 
not include this information, it is not possible to calculate how a 
consumer—even in a collection action—would fare if, for example, she 
counterclaimed for a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Act or breach 
of contract.  The lack of information relating to counterclaims applies 
equally to business defendants.  Because the NAF data contains little 
information about business defendants,66 it does not predict how a 
business defendant would fare on a counterclaim either. 
 
 62. See Public Citizen Report, supra note 2, at 56-57.  In fact, the Public Citizen 
Report has an entire chapter entitled:  “What Consumers Can Do to Fight BMA and 
Protect Themselves.”  Id. at 56.  The Report suggests that consumers should refuse to 
agree to arbitration clauses in any contexts, including situations involving credit cards, 
mortgages, cars, or any other type of consumer debt.  See id. at 56-57. 
 63. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 64. One of the fundamental tenets of statistics is that the sample (i.e., the data 
collected from the study) has to be representative of the population as a whole.  See 
MYATT, supra note 58, at 54 (defining “sample” as a “portion of the population that is 
representative of the entire population”).  In other words, if the sample is not 
representative, then it cannot be used to make statements about the population as a whole. 
 65. The NAF data labeled all but 15 cases as “collection” cases.  In fact, only 13 of 
the 118 cases filed by consumers are not also labeled as “collection” cases.  See Public 
Citizen Report, supra note 2, at 15.  The NAF, however, does not define what it means by 
a “collection” case.  It is puzzling to think that 105 consumer claimants brought 
“collection” actions.  Certainly, those consumers were likely not seeking to collect a debt 
against the corporate defendant.  Perhaps those consumers had counterclaims against 
them for collection of a debt, or perhaps the consumers brought an action to determine 
how much debt they owed (similar to a declaratory judgment action), but there is no way 
to know with certainty.  That 105 consumers brought “collection” actions should raise 
questions as to the facts and claims involved in those consumer-initiated “collection” 
actions. 
 66. See supra note 56. 
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Further, some of the information NAF collected could be clarified 
in order to give a better picture of the arbitral process.  For instance, as 
mentioned above,67 the NAF categorizes a significant number of cases as 
proceeding to “Hearing/Default.”  The difference between a case 
proceeding to hearing and a case ending as a result of default is 
significant.  In some ways, the characterizations are diametrically 
opposed.  Cases that proceed to hearing involve active respondents, 
while cases ending in default involve respondents who do not participate. 
Because of this missing information, analysis of the NAF data 
cannot successfully be extrapolated to all uses of consumer arbitration.  
In addition, the Public Citizen Report overlooks some information that is 
positive for consumers.  In the next sections, this paper deals with 
consumer awards, consumer fees, and the length of the proceeding from 
start to finish. 
B. The Data Shows that Consumers Receive Some Breaks 
As discussed above, the data shows that the arbitrators do not 
always award the full amount claimed.  In fact, in a majority of cases, the 
consumer respondents (defendants) do not have to pay the full amount 
that the business claimant (plaintiff) claimed.  If the consumers do not 
have to pay the full amount claimed—presumably the full amount of the 
debt—this is evidence that consumers are not, in every situation, worse 
off in arbitration than in court. 
Moreover, the arbitral forum allows for a broader scope of potential 
awards than those that a court can provide.  Arbitrators, whose judgment 
is not bound by the law, may consider any number of equitable factors 
before rendering a creative award.68  By contrast, a court is restricted in 
the types of judgments it can award—which are typically limited to 
money damages, and injunctive or declaratory relief. 
Here, the NAF data demonstrates that in well over half of the cases, 
the difference between the amount claimed and the amount recovered is 
greater than zero, suggesting that the arbitrators are utilizing their 
equitable powers in crafting awards.  Independent analysis of the NAF 
data, however, shows that of the nearly 34,000 (33,918) reported cases, 
20,195 of those cases involved situations in which the amount claimed 
 
 67. See supra note 34. 
 68. See, e.g., Note, Julia A. Martin, Arbitrating in the Alps Rather Than Litigating in 
Los Angeles: The Advantages of International Intellectual Property-Specific Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, 49 STAN. L. REV. 917, 930 (1997) (“Finally, arbitration offers one 
often overlooked advantage—the tribunal has considerable discretion when designing 
awards.  ADR can offer sensible or creative options that are not generally available in 
litigation.”). 
COLE  BLANKLEY.DOC 7/1/2009  8:22:29 AM 
2009] EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON CONSUMER ARBITRATION 1065 
was not fully recovered.  In other words, in over 59.5% of the cases, the 
claimant did not receive the amount sought. 
A closer look at these cases, however, shows that not all of these 
cases involved an adjudicated reduction of claim.  The claimants 
dismissed 8,561 of the 20,195 cases.  Stated another way, the party 
bringing the claim dismissed just over 25% of the cases filed with the 
NAF.  When a business dismisses a claim against a consumer, the 
consumer receives a 100% discount on his case.  Of course, the data does 
not disclose the reason for the dismissals69 or whether the cases were 
ultimately re-filed, but this data shows that approximately 25% of the 
consumer respondents were relieved of their obligations through the 
arbitral process. 
In addition, many cases settled.  The NAF data shows that 7,175 of 
the cases settled, which represents another approximately 21% of the 
total cases.  As with the dismissals, the data does not contain all of the 
information necessary to make a full assessment of the situation.  
Admittedly, the cases that settled do not include information regarding 
the amount of the settlement.  A settlement is most often the product of a 
negotiated compromise, as opposed to a “win” or “loss.”70  While a 
precise accounting of concessions present in a compromise is difficult to 
determine, this data suggests that another 21% of the respondents also 
completed the consumer arbitral procedure owing less than the claimant 
initially sought. 
Even cases that went to hearing sometimes resulted in an award that 
was less than what the claimant initially sought.  The data reveals that 
762 cases that proceeded to hearing resulted in awards requiring payment 
of less than the total amount claimed.  Although the 762 cases only 
represent approximately 2% of the total cases, only 2,019 of the total 
cases are labeled as proceeding to a “hearing.”  Among this group of 
cases proceeding to a “hearing” the 762 cases represent more than 37% 
of the “hearing” cases.  Additional data supports that consumers 
proceeding through a hearing do receive some sort of discount on the 
amount claimed.  The NAF has another dispute disposition category 
labeled “Hearing/Default,” and, in this category, 3,632 of the 16,056 
cases were resolved with the respondent owing an amount less than the 
 
 69. Presumably, a party’s reasons for dismissing a case would be privileged, so the 
chances of obtaining this type of information would be slight. 
 70. See Bruce Patton, Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 279 
(Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) (“Negotiation can be defined as 
back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement between two or more 
parties with some interests that are shared and others that may conflict or simply be 
different.”). 
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full amount the plaintiff claimed.71  Stated as a percentage, more than 
22% of these claimants were not required to pay the full amount claimed.  
As noted above,72 this “Hearing/Default” label is ambiguous, and there is 
no indication of how many of these cases went to hearing and how many 
of these cases included default respondents.  Certainly, for cases 
involving a default, the arbitrator would find no reason to discount an 
award given the respondent’s lack of participation.  If the defaults could 
be excluded, the percentage of active respondents (most likely 
consumers) receiving some amount of debt forgiveness would only 
increase. 
In the rarest of cases, arbitrators awarded more than the amount 
claimed.  Our analysis of the data reveals that this situation occurred in 
thirty-three of the approximately 34,000 reported cases, constituting 
considerably less than 1% of the total cases.. In five of the thirty-three 
cases, the difference between the amount claimed and the amount 
awarded was less than $10.00.73  The total difference was less than $100 
in another eleven cases.  Thus, in sixteen of the thirty-three cases 
involving a difference, the difference was less than $100.  In thirteen 
cases, the difference was between $100 and $500.  And in four cases, the 
difference was more than $1000, with the highest difference at 
$2,043.88.  Interestingly, in eighteen of the nineteen cases with the 
biggest differential (including the four biggest differentials), the 
disposition of the dispute is labeled “Award by Settlement Agreement.”74  
Only fourteen of these cases had the dispute resolution label of 
“Hearing” or “Hearing/Default.” 
In all, the NAF data demonstrates that consumers benefit when they 
participate in arbitration because the arbitrator is very likely to reduce 
their debt obligation.  Although the data is robust in terms of the number 
 
 71. The NAF includes one other potential dispute disposition: Award by Settlement 
Agreement.  This category only consists of 84 cases, but, of those cases, 65 include 
situations in which the amount awarded was less than the amount claimed.  If these cases 
are settlements (which is implied, but not entirely clear), then the high percentage of 
discounts (77%) makes sense. 
 72. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 73. Although unclear, such small differences could constitute clerical errors or 
constitute other types of non-substantive reasons for the difference. 
 74. That some of the cases with the largest difference are cases labeled as 
“Settlement by Agreement” might lend some credence to the Public Citizen Report’s 
allegations that arbitrator fees are lumped in with the award amount.  See supra note 54 
and accompanying text.  If the amount awarded is greater than the amount claimed, then 
some of the difference might be explained if the payment of fees is governed by the 
settlement agreement.  Additionally, in the “Settlement by Agreement” category, only 3 
consumers are reported to have paid any arbitration fees at all, perhaps lending 
additional, albeit circumstantial, evidence that arbitrator fees, in some situations, are 
incorporated into settlement awards.  See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text for 
additional information regarding the payment of fees by consumer. 
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of cases, it is also limited in the ways set forth above.  Even with the 
noted limitations, one can still conclude that the overwhelming majority 
of respondents (consumers) did not have to pay the full amount claimed 
in the arbitration.  This result constitutes at least a partial “win” for the 
consumer. 
C. Consumers Pay Few or No Fees in the Reported NAF Arbitrations 
While Public Citizen is particularly critical of consumer arbitration 
when it addresses the potential fees that parties may have to pay in an 
arbitration, the NAF data supports none of the report’s conclusions.75  In 
fact, the NAF data shows that most consumers paid few or no fees in 
these arbitrations, seriously undercutting the Public Citizen Report’s 
conclusions. 
Further analysis of the data shows that in all but five of the 
approximately 34,000 total cases, the consumer paid under (and usually 
well under) $500 in arbitration fees.  In fact, the data shows that in 
33,691 cases (99.6% of cases), the consumer paid absolutely no fee.  In 
33,811 cases, the consumer paid fees in an amount less than $100 (many 
of these consumers paid a $75 fee), and 33,913 cases involved consumer 
fees of less than $500.  Fees in these types of modest numbers are 
certainly comparable to court costs, even those cited in the Public Citizen 
Report.76 
The five cases involving consumer fees greater than $500 are 
extraordinary cases.  Two of these cases involved consumer claims of 
more than $50,000 that the arbitrator ultimately dismissed.77  Two of the 
five cases settled.  One involved a claim for $610,000 and a consumer 
fee of $5,000; and the other a claim of $5,117,000 and a consumer fee of 
$7,000.  Again, consumers initiated both these claims.  The fifth of these 
cases went to hearing.  In that case, the amount claimed was $142,957, 
and the consumer paid a fee of $4,000 (while the business paid a fee of 
$1,959.39).  The arbitrator ultimately awarded the claimed amount.  The 
data, however, also shows that counsel represented all five of these 
consumers.  The last case, in particular, may be an anomaly.  The 
following table summarizes the information regarding consumer fees in 
arbitration, offering additional proof that consumers do not pay high fees 
in NAF arbitration: 
 
 75. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text regarding the Public Citizen 
Report’s discussion of payment of fees. 
 76. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text regarding the Public Citizen 
Report’s discussion of court costs. 
 77. Specifically, one consumer paid $590 in fees on a claim of $50,590 that was later 
dismissed.  The second consumer paid $940 in fees on a claim of $54,881 that was also 
dismissed. 
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 By contrast, the business party paid fees in most cases.  The data 
shows that the business paid some fee in 33,887 cases, or approximately 
99.9% of the cases.  The amount of fees businesses paid is also relatively 
low.  For example, in 10,595 cases, the business paid a fee of $70, and in 
another 8,769 cases, the business paid a fee of only $25.  The business 
paid less than $100 in 25,860 cases, or 76% of total cases.78  The 
following table summarizes the fees business parties paid: 
 
 













 78. Given the number of settlements and dismissals, low fees are not particularly 
surprising.  See supra notes 26, 67-68 and accompanying text regarding the dispute 
disposition for more information regarding how the cases were resolved.  Most 
arbitration fees occur as a result of arbitrator participation (such as ruling on motions or 
writing awards), and if the arbitrator is not very involved in the dispute, then the fees 
would be low. 
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 Businesses rarely escaped payment of fees.79  The business party 
paid no fee in only thirty-one cases.  In twenty-nine of those cases, 
however, the consumer paid some fee.  Two of those cases are mentioned 
above, the two consumer-initiated cases resulting in consumer fees of 
$5,000 and $7,000.  The remaining cases involved consumer fees of less 
than $500.  In twenty-two of the cases, the fees were less than $60.  The 
other fees consumers paid totaled between $110 and $940, with different 
amounts in between. 
The highest reported fee a business paid is $51,530.80  This case 
involved a dispute in which the business originally sought $173,362.72.  
The case went to hearing, and the arbitrator ultimately awarded 
$118,886.68 ($54,000 less than the claim).  The consumer, although 
found liable for part of the debt, paid approximately $10 in arbitration 
fees.  While this case is interesting, it also appears to be an anomaly.  It 
demonstrates that significant fees may be involved in arbitration—for 
either party—but that arbitrators sometimes reduce significantly the 
amount the consumer owes. 
Because arbitration fees often depend on the services the arbitrator 
provides, fees generally increase the longer the proceeding takes.  The 
following table gives statistics for fees depending on the dispute 
disposition: 
 
 79. The NAF’s data that businesses pay fees in the overwhelming majority of cases 
undercuts the Public Citizen Report’s argument that fees are simply incorporated into 
arbitration awards.  See supra note 54 and accompanying text.  If the data reports that 
parties are paying fees, the question is how those fees could also be included in the 
award?  Perhaps the answer to this question depends on what is characterized as a “fee.”  
The numbers reported may include any number of types of fees, such as filing fees, 
administrative fees, and fees associated with arbitrator time.  Without additional detail, it 
is impossible to know, however, whether some fees, like administrative fees and filing 
fees, are reported as “fees,” while arbitrator expenses may be included in the arbitration 
award. 
 80. The data reports two nearly identical cases with identical amounts claimed, 
amounts awarded, business fees, etc., with two exceptions.  First, the data shows two 
different case ID numbers.  Second, the data shows that the consumer paid no fees under 
one ID number and a fee of $10 in another ID number.  Presumably, two identical claims 
and awards in the hundreds of thousands of dollars cannot be a coincidence, leading to 
two possible reasons for the anomaly.  The figures could be the result of a clerical error 
or the claim could have more than one issue (perhaps a counterclaim?) causing the case 
to be reported twice in the data.  No matter the reason for the anomaly, this paper will 
treat the two ID numbers as a single case. 
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Fees Involved in NAF Arbitrations 
 
This data reveals that cases proceeding to hearing have significantly 
larger average fees ($706) compared to any other type of dispute 
disposition. 
In sum, the NAF data shows that consumers are not paying 
significant fees in NAF arbitration, if they are paying fees at all.  The 
cases involving the biggest consumer fees are those cases consumers 
bring.  The businesses, too, generally pay low fees.  Overall, the data is 
best viewed in the context of the length of time the case was pending and 
the amount of arbitrator involvement. 
D. Arbitration Cases Are Generally Short in Duration 
Finally, this section considers the amount of time consumers spend 
in arbitration, which, based on available data, is roughly the same or less 
than they would spend in court.  Although arbitration should be quicker 
and more efficient than court, as arbitration becomes more like litigation, 
the procedure also takes more time.81  Consumers, however, presumably 
benefit from a typically shorter process and the ability to move on with 
their lives.82 
 
 81. See Brian Levine, Preclusion Confusion: A Call for Per Se Rules Preventing the 
Application of Collateral Estoppel to Findings Made in Nontraditional Litigation, 1999 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 435, 460 (1999) (“[A]rbitration has gradually become more formal, 
expensive, and time-consuming, to the point where it now closely resembles courtroom 
litigation.”). 
 82. The Public Citizen Report does not address the issue of the length of the 
arbitration proceedings.  Instead, the Report takes some issue with perceived discovery 
limitations in arbitration.  See Public Citizen Report, supra note 2, at 9-10 (reporting that 
the due process rights, including discovery rights, of consumers are not protected in the 
arbitral forum).  Of course, the more discovery that occurs in arbitration, the longer the 
arbitration will take.  In other words, this area is a double-edged sword.  If the process 
allows for comprehensive discovery, then the process can be described as too long and 
onerous.  If the proceedings are streamlined and quicker, then the process can be 
described as depriving consumers of their due process. 
COLE  BLANKLEY.DOC 7/1/2009  8:22:29 AM 
2009] EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON CONSUMER ARBITRATION 1071 
The NAF data shows that a majority of arbitration cases are settled 
within 200 days, or in under seven months.  To be more exact, 23,915 
cases fall into the under 200-day category, and another 6,713 cases are 
resolved within 400 days, or under fourteen months.  A chart showing 
the length of time for the data set as a whole is as follows: 
 
Length of Time of NAF Arbitrations 
 
The longest case in this data set lasted 1,385 days, or over three and a 
half years.  That case went to a hearing where the arbitrator awarded the 
business claimant the full $7,859.14 it sought.83 
As expected, cases that proceed to hearing generally last longer than 
those resolved in other fashions.  The following chart provides statistics 
for the length of the proceeding grouped according to dispute disposition: 
 
Another factor to consider is how much discovery is needed in a “collection” case?  If the 
dispute really concerns the payment of a debt owed, the consumer should have most—if 
not all—of the information already in his or her possession.  Certainly the amount of 
necessary discovery depends on the type of case, but in nearly all situations, the more 
discovery that occurs, the longer and more involved the process becomes. 
 83. The business paid the full $420 in arbitration fees. 
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Average Length of NAF Arbitration by Dispute Resolution 
 
Perhaps the most striking statistic is the length of time it takes for cases 
to proceed through hearing.  In the “Hearing” category, cases resolved in 
an average of 204 days, or less than seven months.  The category of 
“Hearing/Default” resulted in a slightly shorter average.  Interestingly, 
according to these statistics, the cases that settled apparently did so late 
in the process.  The mean84 and mode85 length of arbitrations of settled 
cases is greater than every other category, with the exception of “Award 
by Settlement Agreement.”  This information leads to a curious 
conclusion that a case would take longer to settle than it would to 
proceed to hearing.  Otherwise, the data generally shows that the more 
involved the process is, the longer the process will take.86  According to 
this data, consumers appear to spend less time in arbitration than they 
would in court.  Comparing the NAF data to the publicly available data 
regarding the federal courts in California is useful, recognizing that some 
percentage of these cases would be brought in state rather than federal 
 
 84. Mean is the average of all of the points of data.  The mean is calculated by 
adding all of the values and then dividing by the total number of values.  Although the 
mean, or average, is a very common statistic, it is very easily influenced by outliers, or 
data points that are extreme in one direction or the other.  See MYATT, supra note 58, at 
57 (“The mean (also referred to as average) is the most commonly used indication of 
central tendency for variables measured on the interval or ratio scales.  It is defined as the 
sum of all of the values divided by the number of values.”). 
 85. Mode is the “most commonly reported value for a particular variable.”  Id. at 56. 
 86. The difference between the mean, median, and the mode for the category 
“Hearing/Default” is another interesting statistic.  The mode is only 84 days (less than 
three months), the median is 139 days (less than five months), while the mean is 181 days 
(approximately six months).  Because a default can occur if a respondent does not answer 
within a set number of days, cases resulting in default awards would presumably be 
resolved quickly.  Because the median is 139 days, half of the cases must have resolved 
in 139 days or less—suggesting that this category includes a significant number of 
default awards. 
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court.87  In particular, the federal courts maintain statistics showing the 
number of months that cases remain pending in their courts, including a 
special category of cases that proceed to trial.88 
As a general matter, NAF arbitrations are resolved more quickly 
than federal cases in California, particularly when compared to the cases 
that proceed to trial.89  The federal court data shows: 
 
Average Length of California Court Cases in Months (filing to disposition 
on top—filing to trial on bottom) 
 
Court 2007 2006 2007 2004 2003 2002 
6.8 7.2 7.4 7.3 7.5 7.9 C.D. Cal 
21.3 21.3 20.5 17.8 21.2 20.0 
9.3 10.1 10.7 9.3 9.7 9.1 E.D. Cal 
38.0 34.0 32.5 27.5 34.0 26.0 
6.7 7.4 9.8 8.2 10.6 9.5 N.D. Cal 
24.9 25.0 28.0 22.5 30.3 23.5 
5.9 6.6 6.3 6.9 6.5 6.4 S.D. Cal 
24.0 33.0 25.4 30.0 23.5 21.0 
 
Based on this information, consumers in arbitration spend less time in 
arbitration than the average litigant in federal court with respect to both 
the total amount of time and the time from filing to a hearing.  The 
difference is particularly telling when the time it takes to get to trial is 
compared to the time it takes to get to a hearing. 
 
 87. The U.S. courts maintain statistics on each court in the United States.  See 
Federal Court Management Statistics, http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/index.html.  The 
reason why this article discusses the statistics relating to California is because the NAF 
data concerns only California cases. 
 88. The U.S. courts maintain separate data for civil and criminal cases.  This article 
only discusses the civil cases. 
 89. The U.S. court data shows trends over six-year periods, which is particularly 
helpful here where the NAF data spanned from 2003 to 2007. 
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IV. EVEN THE COURTS DO NOT PERCEIVE NAF BIAS 
Given the nature of the NAF data, it is not surprising that courts 
addressing issues related to consumer arbitrations before the NAF have 
almost uniformly enforced NAF-administered pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses.  As a general matter, courts find that the NAF provides a fair and 
adequate forum for consumers. 
A common consumer argument is that pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses are unconscionable.  To prove unconscionability, a party must 
establish both that the contract is procedurally unconscionable, i.e., the 
parties do not have equal bargaining power; and that it is substantively 
unconscionable, i.e., the terms of the contract are inherently unfair to the 
party with the inferior bargaining position.90  Generally speaking, the 
courts addressing the issue hold that the consumer arbitration agreements 
requiring arbitration before the NAF are not so inherently unfair as to 
make the contracts substantively unconscionable.91 
In some cases, the consumer explicitly argues that the use of the 
NAF as the arbitration provider renders an arbitration clause 
unconscionable.  In fact, some of these cases involve claims similar to 
those types of cases reported in the NAF arbitration data—claims by or 
against credit card companies.  In 2008, the court in Cronin v. Citi-
Financial Services, Inc.92 compelled arbitration despite a claim of 
unconscionability.93  The court found that the costs of arbitration were 
not unduly burdensome for the consumer.94  As a result, it upheld the 
 
 90. See, e.g., Cronin v. Citi-Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 08-1523, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
57356, at *7 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 2008) (“In Pennsylvania, a party challenging a contract 
for unconscionability has the burden of establishing both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability.”) (citing Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 
1999)); March v. Tysinger Motor Co., No. 3:07-CV-508, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91202, 
at *11 (E.D. Va. Dec. 12, 2007) (“A contract is unconscionable if it is one that no man in 
his senses and not under a delusion would make, on the one hand, and [that] no fair man 
would accept, on the other.”). 
 91. The test for unconscionability requires satisfaction of both prongs of the test.  
Thus, even if the parties are assumed to have unequal bargaining power (and generally 
the consumers and corporations have unequal bargaining power), the contract is still valid 
and enforceable if the terms are not unfair.  See Cronin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57356, at 
*8 (“Disparity in bargaining power does not itself support a finding of 
unconscionability.”); Miller v. Equifirst Corp. of WV, No. 2:00-0335, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 63816, at *22 (S.D.W.Va. Sept. 5, 2006) (“However, a finding that a contract is 
one of adhesion does not automatically render the contract unenforceable; rather, 
‘[f]inding that there is an adhesion contract is the beginning point for analysis, not the 
end of it.’”) (citation omitted). 
 92. No. 08-1523, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57356. 
 93. Id. at *1. 
 94. See id. at *12 (“The agreement places most of the cost of arbitration on the 
defendant, not the plaintiff.  The only way the plaintiff would bear more costs than the 
equivalent of a court filing fee (an amount he already paid, when he filed suit in this 
Court) is if an arbitrator determined that he made an unjustified or bad faith claim against 
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requirement that the consumer use the NAF or the American Arbitration 
Association (“AAA”), despite the consumer’s argument that the two 
organizations are “repeat players” who frequently arbitrate claims for the 
defendant.95  Indeed, without proof that an arbitral provider actually 
prefers the “repeat player,” courts are hesitant to find an arbitration 
agreement requiring arbitration before NAF (or AAA for that matter) 
unconscionable.96  In a 2007 case, the Northern District of California 
held that the “NAF has been recognized by other courts as a viable 
alternative to the judicial system,”97 despite the consumer’s claim of 
“repeat player” preference. 
 
the defendant.”); see also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 
(2000) (requiring a showing that arbitration expenses are likely to be prohibitive); March, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91202, at *13-15 (rejecting consumer claim that the fees under 
NAF rules were unconscionable); Schiano v. MBNA, No. 05-1771, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 59694, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2007) (finding moot the consumer’s claim 
regarding fees when the credit card company actually paid all of the fees); Jaimez v. 
MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., No. 05-2478-KHV, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7526, at *10 (D. 
Kan. Feb. 27, 2006) (finding the agreement not unconscionable when, under the 
agreement, MBNA agreed to pay all costs beyond the costs the consumer would have 
been required to pay in court); In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 265 F. 
Supp. 2d 385, 412 (S.D. N.Y. 2003) (“This fee schedule in the NAF Code has been 
upheld as adequate and fair by numerous courts.”) (citations omitted); see supra notes 71-
76 for a discussion of the fees actually paid by consumers in the NAF arbitration data.  
But see Hollins v. Debt Relief of Am., 479 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1107 (D. Neb. 2007) 
(finding arbitration clause with NAF unconscionable when the NAF is silent on class 
action  procedures and when the contract required “financially impaired Nebraska 
residents” to resolve their disputes in Dallas, TX). 
 95. Cronin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57356, at *14.  The Cronin court cited the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) 
for the proposition that courts should not “indulge the presumption that the parties and 
the arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, 
conscientious and impartial arbitrators.”  Id. at *15 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30); see 
also March, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91202, at *20 (“So, the fact that Tysinger picked the 
NAF—an organization that, according to the Marches, favors creditors—does not 
invalidate the parties’ arbitration agreement.”). 
 96. See Oestriecher v. Alienware Corp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 
2007) (“Apart from its categorical assault on the NAF as an allegedly industry-friendly 
forum, however, Oestreicher makes no specific, compelling arguments showing that the 
NAF would be inappropriate in this action.  Accordingly, Oestreicher has made only a 
weak showing of non-mutuality, and in light of Oestreicher’s minimal showing of 
procedural unconscionability Oestreicher has failed to establish that the NAF provision is 
unenforceable.”); see also Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886, 898 (Ill. 
Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting the “repeat player” and other arguments made by consumers 
trying to escape an arbitration agreement).  In Oestriecher, however, the court found the 
entire agreement to be unenforceable because of the presence of an unenforceable class-
action waiver.  See 502 F. Supp. 2d at 1071-72.  Interestingly, the defendant corporation 
agreed that a finding that the class-action waiver is unenforceable would make the entire 
agreement unenforceable.  Id. 
 97. Carmack v. Chase Manhattan Bank (USA), 521 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1026 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007) (citing Randolph, 531 U.S. at 95 n.2) (listing the NAF as a dispute-resolution 
forum with fair fee-shifting provisions). 
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Courts have enforced agreements to arbitrate consumer disputes 
before the NAF in other contexts as well.  For example, in Davis v. Dell, 
Inc.,98 the plaintiff consumer alleged that the pre-dispute arbitration 
clause with the defendant computer company “is unconscionable because 
of the inherent unfairness of the NAF, the arbitration forum provided for 
in the Terms and Conditions.”99  The District Court flatly rejected this 
argument, however, because the “NAF has been repeatedly held up as a 
fair and reasonable forum” and because plaintiffs presented “no evidence 
whatsoever” that the plaintiff “would be unfairly treated by any 
arbitrator.”100  The court in Davis held:  “[t]he Court does not find that 
requiring arbitration through the NAF is unconscionable.”101  In 
Provencher v. Dell, Inc.,102 the court went as far as to state that the NAF 
 
 98. No. 07-630, 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 62490 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2008). 
 99. Id. at *14. 
 100. Id. at *14-15 (citing Marsh v. First USA Bank. N.A., 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 929 
(N.D. Tex. 2000)) (“The Court is satisfied that NAF will provide a reasonable, fair, and 
impartial forum within which Plaintiffs may seek redress for their grievances.”); see also 
Vera v. First USA Bank, N.A., No. Civ. A. 00-89, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9052, 2001 
WL 640979, at 1 (D. Del. Apr. 19, 2001) (“NAF is a model for fair cost and fee 
allocation.”); Marsh, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 925 (“Plaintiffs’ accusations of bias are directed 
toward NAF, not the independent arbitrators who actually conduct the arbitration.  Aside 
from the Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations, there is no evidence whatsoever that they 
would be unfairly treated by any arbitrator.”); Oestriecher, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 
(rejecting the consumer’s arguments that “the NAF is an industry-friendly forum that is 
structurally biased against consumers”); Gorokhovsky v. MBNA Am. Bank NA, No. 
06C1120, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46238, at *3-4 (E.D. Wis. June 25, 2007) (“Plaintiff’s 
claim that Wolpoff controls the NAF is based entirely on highly speculative information 
gleaned from the Internet.”). 
In at least one case, Toppings v. Meritech Mortgage Servs., Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 
683 (S.D. W.Va. 2001), the court entertained the consumers’ claims that arbitrations in 
front of the NAF had the potential for bias.  Rather than dismiss the case entirely, though, 
the court denied the motion to compel pending additional discovery on the issue.  Id. at 
686. 
 101. Davis, 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 62490, at *15.  The Davis case is also noteworthy 
because the court upheld the arbitration clause despite the presence of a class-action 
waiver.  See id. at *11-14.  Specifically, the court stated: “Therefore, the arbitration 
clause is not against a fundamental public policy of New Jersey.”  Id. at *14.  Although 
the NAF arbitration data makes no mention of class-action issues, the Public Citizen 
Report takes serious issues with the potential for a class-action waiver.  See Public 
Citizen Report, supra note 2, at 43-46 (“The same contracts that require binding 
mandatory arbitration often ban customers from joining class action lawsuits and class 
arbitrations.  Such a ban means that corporate fraud and abuse may go utterly 
unchecked.”). 
In addition to the Davis case, the case of Sherr v. Dell, Inc., No. 05 CV 10097, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51864 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2006), also required a consumer to arbitrate a 
claim under Dell’s consumer arbitration clause.  The Sherr court refused to find the 
arbitration unconscionable when Dell agreed to pay the fees of the arbitration, id. at *16, 
and despite the presence of a class-action ban, id. at *20-21.  See also Hubbert v. Dell 
Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113, 126 (Ill. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding Dell consumer arbitration 
clause requiring arbitration before the NAF). 
 102. 409 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
COLE  BLANKLEY.DOC 7/1/2009  8:22:29 AM 
2009] EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON CONSUMER ARBITRATION 1077 
“is without question an inexpensive, efficient, and convenient forum for 
resolving commercial disputes.”103  These cases demonstrate that courts 
generally regard the NAF as an acceptable alternative for those 
consumers who agree to binding arbitration. 
The courts, however, do not uniformly uphold arbitrations in front 
of the NAF simply because NAF is the arbitral provider.  For some 
courts, the ability to waive a class action under NAF rules is enough to 
make an arbitration agreement unenforceable104—but these cases turn on 
the class-action waiver, not on the alleged bias of NAF arbitrators.  Other 
courts find provisions other than (or in addition to) the fact that the NAF 
is the chosen provider to be the reason why the clause is found 
unconscionable.105 
Even where a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, a consumer may 
claim bias on the part of the arbitrator in an attempt to vacate the 
arbitrator’s award.106  Some courts consider the NAF’s rules and codes of 
ethics when determining whether the NAF provided them a fair hearing.  
For instance, in Carmack, the Northern District of California held that 
the NAF Rules of Procedure provided consumers with due process.107  
 
 103. Id. at 1198.  Ultimately, the court concluded:  “Simply put, Mr. Provencher made 
a deal with Dell to arbitrate his disputes with Dell before the NAF and waive his right to 
proceed by way of class action.  There is no legitimate reason under Texas law for not 
holding Mr. Provencher to that deal.  He must arbitrate his claims before the NAF and he 
cannot proceed by way of this class action.”  Id. at 1206. 
 104. See, e.g., Klussman v. Cross Country Bank, 134 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1299-1300 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (finding the class-action waiver unconscionable, but not addressing 
other issues relating to NAF, including arbitrator bias). 
 105. See., e.g., Mercuro v. The Superior Ct. of Los Angeles County, 96 Cal. App. 4th 
167, 178-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (expressing concern over “repeat player” bias but holds 
that this employment arbitration agreement is unconscionable under the theory that 
statutory rights could not be vindicated in arbitral forum); see also Hollins v. Debt Relief 
of Am., 479 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (D. Neb. 2007). 
 106. See Bellavia v. First USA Bank, N.A., No. 02 C 3971, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18907, *8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2003) (“[I]f the arbitration panel in fact renders an award 
that is based on arbitrator bias, [plaintiff] has a remedy—he may seek to vacate the 
award.”); see also 9 U.S.C. § 10. 
 107. Carmack v. Chase Manhattan Bank (USA), 521 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1025 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007) (“the National Arbitration Forum provides all of these procedural safeguards 
in its Code of Procedure.”).  The Carmack court stated: 
Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts indicating improper motives by the NAF 
arbitrator.  As stated, the National Arbitration Forum provides the procedural 
protection of a neutral arbitrator; plaintiff had the opportunity to challenge the 
neutrality of her arbitrator during the course of arbitration, yet she chose not to 
do so.  Moreover, in Woods, the Ninth Circuit upheld as impartial an arbitration 
panel with a much more obvious source of bias than the NAF arbitrator here—
the arbitrators there were employees and business associates of one of the 
parties.  Here, the only business relationship pleaded by plaintiff is defendant’s 
regular use of the NAF as an arbitrator in credit card disputes.  Without 
pleading facts that specifically indicate improper motives by the NAF 
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Similarly, in Bank One, N.A. v. Coates,108 the court held that, in the 
absence of further evidence, the NAF code of ethics derailed an 
argument that NAF arbitrators were biased.109  In Miller v. Equifirst 
Corp., the District of West Virginia compared the plaintiffs’ fears about 
arbitration with those the Supreme Court rejected in Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson, noting that NAF procedures require that: 
(1) prior to the selection of the arbitrator the names and qualifications 
of potential arbitrators are provided to the party; (2) the arbitrator is 
required to be “neutral and independent” and disclose any 
circumstances that might constitute a conflict of interest or cause the 
arbitrator to be unfair or biased; and (3) in the arbitrator selection 
process each party has one peremptory challenge and unlimited 
challenges for cause.110 
Without solid evidence of arbitrator bias, then, the courts appear willing 
to rely on the safeguards the NAF creates through its rules and codes of 
ethics to justify enforcing NAF-drafted arbitration awards. 
Although courts continue to consider carefully unconscionability 
challenges to arbitration agreements, they do not find agreements 
unconscionable on the basis that NAF is the arbitral provider.  The NAF 
data, as analyzed in this article, supports the view that requiring 
consumers to arbitrate using NAF arbitrators does not create a basis for 
finding arbitration agreements unconscionable. 
 
arbitrator, plaintiff fails to state a claim for vacating or correcting the NAF 
arbitration award. 
Id. at 1027. 
 108. 125 F. Supp. 2d 819 (S.D. Miss. 2001).  In Miller v. Equifirst Corp., the 
Southern District of West Virginia similarly held that without real evidence of arbitrator 
bias, the NAF rules and procedures provide “adequate mechanisms . . . to ensure that the 
parties will ultimately select a neutral arbitrator.”  2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63816, at *48-
49; see also id. at *45 (noting unwillingness to cede to the consumer’s “general antipathy 
to arbitration”). 
 109. See Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 835 (“[T]he rules governing the conduct of NAF 
arbitrations belie defendant’s speculation that suspected bias by the NAF has any realistic 
potential for affecting decisions of arbitrators in NAF arbitrations.”); see also Carbajal v. 
H & R Block Tax Services, Inc., 372 F.3d 903 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming district court’s 
order compelling arbitration at the NAF); Lux v. Good Guys, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 25167, 2006 WL 357820 *5 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (Carney, J.) (“Mr. Lux has not 
shown that the National Arbitration Forum (‘NAF’) is one-sided.”); Beneficial Nat’l 
Bank, U.S.A. v. Payton, 214 F. Supp. 2d 679, 690-91 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (rejecting the 
consumer’s argument that the NAF arbitrators are biased without any proof of bias). 
 110. Miller, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63816, at *46 (citing Rules 20, 21, and 23 of the 
NAF Code of Procedure). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Certainly no dispute resolution process—including the court 
system—is perfect, and the mandatory use of consumer arbitration raises 
issues of concern.  As mentioned above, the primary issue is the potential 
for “repeat player” bias.  The existence of a small pool of arbitrators who 
may not always disclose previous work for the repeat players heightens 
this concern.  The data does not, however, support a “repeat player” bias 
finding nor does it establish that arbitrators disregard legal and ethical 
reporting requirements.  The NAF data simply cannot resolve these 
potentially troublesome issues. 
The NAF data establishes that consumers find success in arbitration.  
And, even when the consumers “lose” as defined in the Public Citizen 
Report, the “losses” may actually be partial “wins.”  In addition, the data 
demonstrates that consumers, as a whole, are not paying exorbitant fees 
and that they typically resolve their disputes in less than one year.  
Moreover, the courts reasonably conclude that arbitration in front of the 
NAF, in and of itself, does not render a consumer arbitration agreement 
unconscionable. 
Although the NAF data contains much useful information, 
additional data would provide a more complete picture of consumer 
arbitration.  First, a more detailed description of the claims at issue in 
each arbitration, rather than the general category of “collection” cases, 
would help researchers evaluate the consumer arbitration process.  
Second, some indication of the number and specificity of the claims 
would also be useful, as would an indication of whether the 
respondent/consumer brought counterclaims and the nature of those 
counterclaims.  Finally, the study would be enhanced if the data 
specifically separated the cases ending in a default judgment from those 
that end with a contested hearing.  With these additions, the information 
collected would be greatly enhanced and would shed more light on the 
issue of fairness in the consumer arbitration process. 
 
